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The Uneven Cost of Pakistan's Internal War: Why Its Western Provinces Are Paying the Highest Price

Pakistan's escalating internal security crisis is exposing a widening divide in the country's security burden. While militant violence remains heavily concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, the police, locally recruited paramilitary personnel and security forces operating closest to the affected communities are bearing an increasingly disproportionate share of the casualties. The latest figures for 2026 suggest that the crisis is deepening, with Balochistan emerging as the country's worst-affected province. Yet behind the mounting death toll lies a more uncomfortable question: who is actually paying the human cost of Pakistan's prolonged counterterrorism campaign?

Pakistan's internal security crisis is often presented through the language of military operations, militant casualties and territorial control. But the casualty figures tell a more complicated story. The violence is not distributed evenly across the country, and neither is the burden of confronting it.

In 2025, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa recorded 2,331 deaths linked to militant violence and counterterrorism operations, while Balochistan recorded 956. Punjab, by comparison, registered just 40 deaths and Sindh 56, according to figures compiled by the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS). Together, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan accounted for more than 96 per cent of the fatalities.

Other security monitors have documented a similar geographical concentration. The Pak Institute for Peace Studies recorded 699 militant attacks in 2025, with more than 95 per cent occurring in the two western provinces. The Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), using a broader definition, counted 1,063 attacks and likewise identified Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the former tribal districts and Balochistan as the principal centres of violence.

The pattern is unmistakable. Pakistan's security crisis is overwhelmingly concentrated in its western regions, while much of the country's population centres remain comparatively insulated from the daily consequences.

2026: A worsening security landscape

The figures for the first ten months of 2026 suggest that the situation has deteriorated further. PICSS recorded 1,376 attacks and 3,902 deaths resulting from attacks and counterterrorism operations between January and October. This already exceeds the 3,387 combat-related deaths recorded for the whole of 2025, although the two datasets may not use identical definitions.

CRSS data also points to a sharp escalation. The organisation recorded 813 fatalities in the first quarter, 774 in the second and 1,415 in the third quarter. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan together accounted for approximately 98 per cent of the third-quarter total.

More significantly, Balochistan overtook Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as the worst-affected province, accounting for nearly 88 per cent of the national increase in fatalities during the quarter.

October offered some temporary relief in the number of reported attacks. PICSS recorded 143 attacks, compared with 226 in September, while deaths from attacks declined from 260 to 111. However, the organisation cautioned against interpreting a single month's decline as evidence of a sustained improvement. Kidnappings increased to 88, the highest monthly figure in a year.

The geographical contrast remained striking. Punjab recorded two attacks and four deaths during October, while Sindh, Islamabad, POJK and Gilgit-Baltistan reported none.

The figures demonstrate how deeply the security crisis has become concentrated in Pakistan's western provinces. They also raise questions about the sustainability of a security strategy that continues to depend heavily on personnel deployed in areas where violence has become a recurring reality.

The frontline is increasingly local

One of the most revealing aspects of Pakistan's internal conflict is the rising number of casualties among security personnel. According to PICSS, 664 security personnel were killed in 2025, a 26 per cent increase over 2024 and the highest annual figure since 2011.

The first two months of 2026 added another 126 deaths. July proved particularly deadly, with 112 security personnel killed nationwide. In Balochistan alone, security-force fatalities increased from six in June to 62 in July.

These figures highlight the intensity of the conflict, but they also expose an important distinction within Pakistan's security architecture.

The Pakistani Army remains the dominant institution in the country's counterterrorism framework. However, much of the day-to-day security burden in affected districts falls on provincial police and locally recruited paramilitary personnel who remain embedded in communities long after army formations rotate elsewhere.

This distinction is particularly visible in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Police records published by Dawn in August 2026 indicated that more than 2,600 police and Federal Constabulary personnel had been killed in the province since 1970. The year 2025 was the deadliest on record, with 235 deaths, including 159 Federal Constabulary personnel. Another 150 personnel had reportedly died by 2 July 2026.

The distinction between the Federal Constabulary and the Frontier Corps is important. Although both are frequently associated with Pakistan's internal security operations, they are separate organisations with different structures and responsibilities.

The Frontier Corps is a federal paramilitary force under the Interior Ministry, led by serving Army officers, while much of its rank and file is recruited locally. Senior command positions have historically been filled through army deputations.

Yet the Frontier Corps does not have a separately published casualty series that would allow its losses to be examined independently. CRSS recorded 374 deaths among Army and Frontier Corps personnel combined in 2025, without providing a breakdown between the two.

This absence of detailed casualty information makes it difficult to establish precisely how the human cost is distributed across Pakistan's security institutions.

The burden beyond the Army

The concentration of casualties among provincial police and locally deployed personnel deserves greater attention.

An Express Tribune editorial in August 2026 highlighted how police officers remain exposed to militant attacks in areas where the military's large counterterrorism operations have already taken place. Army formations may conduct major clearance operations and subsequently rotate, but police personnel continue to operate in the same communities, where militants can retain networks and exploit local vulnerabilities.

The casualty trend among Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police is particularly concerning. The number of deaths rose from 93 in 2022 to 197 in 2023, declined to 169 in 2024 and climbed to 235 in 2025. Another 150 deaths were recorded in the first half of 2026.

This raises a difficult question about the long-term effectiveness of Pakistan's counterterrorism approach. If large-scale military operations are followed by sustained attacks against local security personnel, the challenge is not simply clearing militant positions. It is ensuring that the state can maintain security after those operations conclude.

The distinction between military success and lasting security is critical. An operation may eliminate militant personnel or disrupt an armed network, but the long-term result depends on whether local institutions can prevent those networks from returning.

The recent attacks in Kohat and Swabi illustrate this vulnerability. Reports on 12 November described an ambush on a police team in Kohat that killed at least ten personnel, according to one account citing police officials. Another report put the toll at 11, including senior police officers. Two additional policemen were killed in an attack on a checkpoint in Swabi.

The conflicting casualty figures underline the difficulties of establishing an independently verified account during ongoing security incidents. Nevertheless, the attacks demonstrate the exposure of provincial police personnel to sustained militant violence.

In Balochistan, the reported attack on the military camp in Mastung on 12 November further illustrated the intensity of the insurgency. Reports indicated that an explosives-laden vehicle struck the camp, although the reported casualty claims had not been independently verified at the time of publication.

Balochistan's growing security crisis

The deterioration in Balochistan deserves particular attention because the province is now emerging as the principal centre of Pakistan's escalating internal violence.

Unlike the militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which is heavily associated with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and related networks, Balochistan faces a distinct insurgency driven by separatist armed organisations, including the banned Baloch Liberation Army.

The province's security crisis is therefore more complex than a conventional counterterrorism campaign. It involves armed separatism, attacks against security installations, kidnappings and longstanding political grievances.

The increasing number of casualties among security personnel reflects the operational difficulties of confronting armed groups across a vast and geographically challenging province.

At the same time, the merging of Balochistan's Levies into the provincial police since 2025 is changing the structure of local security institutions. This transition makes it even more important to maintain transparent and consistent casualty records across different forces.

The absence of a comprehensive breakdown risks obscuring the extent to which locally recruited personnel are carrying the burden of the conflict.

The question of representation and institutional accountability

The composition of Pakistan's Army has also featured prominently in discussions about the country's internal security burden. However, available demographic figures require careful interpretation.

An ISPR information brief reported in 2007 indicated that Punjabis accounted for just over 57 per cent of the Army in 2007, compared with more than 71 per cent in 2001. The same figures placed the representation of Pakhtuns at 14.5 per cent, Sindhis at 17 per cent and Baloch personnel at approximately 3.2 per cent, with a projected increase.

A 2014 analysis of newly recruited officers placed Punjab's share at 59 per cent and Balochistan's at four per cent.

These figures are dated and cannot be treated as an accurate representation of the Army's current composition. Nor do they establish that the officer corps is necessarily more heavily dominated by one community than the ranks.

Nevertheless, the limited public availability of updated demographic information makes it difficult to assess how representative Pakistan's military institutions have become.

More importantly, there is no comprehensive public record showing how casualties are distributed by security organisation, district and year.

Such information would help establish whether the burden is falling disproportionately on particular institutions or recruitment pools. Without it, claims about which communities are bearing the greatest cost remain difficult to demonstrate conclusively.

A security strategy facing difficult questions

Pakistan's internal conflict is no longer adequately described through the number of operations conducted or militants reportedly eliminated. The rising casualty figures, geographical concentration of violence and growing exposure of local security personnel point to a deeper institutional challenge.

The Army cannot be treated as a spectator in this conflict. Its operations, deployments and strategic decisions remain central to Pakistan's security policy. But the personnel who continue to face militant attacks on a daily basis are not necessarily the same personnel who conduct the largest military campaigns.

Provincial police, Federal Constabulary personnel and locally recruited paramilitary forces remain on the frontline in many affected areas. Their casualties deserve the same institutional attention and public recognition as those of the regular Army.

There is also a need for greater transparency. Pakistan's security establishment routinely announces operational successes and identifies military personnel killed in major engagements. Yet the absence of a consolidated casualty database covering the Army, Frontier Corps, Federal Constabulary and provincial police leaves an important gap in public understanding.

A comprehensive accounting of losses, broken down by force, district and year, would provide a more accurate picture of the conflict and help policymakers assess the effectiveness of existing security arrangements.

Ultimately, the figures from 2025 and 2026 reveal an uncomfortable reality. Pakistan's internal war is being fought overwhelmingly in its western provinces, and the human cost is falling most heavily on the institutions and personnel closest to the violence.

The challenge for Islamabad is not merely to increase the scale of military operations. It is to build a security framework capable of sustaining stability after those operations end, strengthening local institutions and addressing the conditions that allow militant networks to survive.

Without that shift, Pakistan risks remaining trapped in a cycle in which military operations produce temporary gains, local security forces continue to absorb casualties and the violence returns.

The real measure of success will not be the number of operations announced from military headquarters. It will be whether the people and security personnel living and working in Pakistan's western provinces can finally experience lasting security.